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This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the
behavior of economies with prominent features of international
finance. Two ‘‘countries,’’ each with its own currency, were cre-
ated. International trade could take place only through the opera-
tion of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of
funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce
general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior
of the economies. Prices of goods, as well as the exchange rate,
evolve over time toward the predictions of the models. However,
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both the law of one price and purchasing power parity can be re-
jected for reasons that do not appear in the literature. Patterns of
international trade were as predicted by the law of comparative
advantage.
I. Introduction
The interdependencies inherent in the structure of international
financial flows and international economic activity motivated some
of the earliest attempts to develop the basic principles of economics.
The theorizing predated Adam Smith by decades and has been the
subject of almost constant evolution during the intervening centu-
ries. Principles of economic behavior were isolated by partial equilib-
rium theories and were integrated over the years to construct the
general competitive model. The overriding power of this model to
provide consistency in sets of ideas and theories cannot be denied,
and, as such, it stands as a remarkable intellectual achievement.
However, the accuracy of the model might be challenged in special
applications, and the specific quantitative predictions of the model
might not be testable in the complicated setting of the naturally oc-
curring world.
The experiments reported below were designed to explore the
ability of the competitive equilibrium model to predict and track
prices and exchange rates. The experimental economies are extraor-
dinarily complex and contain some of the complexities about which
decades, if not centuries, of theorizing have grappled. Of course,
they are simple relative to the naturally occurring economies to
which the competitive model is frequently applied.
The experiments deal with two broad questions. First, to what ex-
tent does the competitive model help explain the behavior of an
international economic system? Does the system behave at all as one
would expect from the study of a set of equilibrium equations? While
the experimental economies are simple relative to the naturally oc-
curring ones, they are nevertheless economies in which several of
the assumptions of the competitive model are violated to one degree
or another. The model is constructed from many ‘‘partial equilib-
rium components,’’ and if one part fails, the whole model fails. The
question addressed is which parts, if any, seem to work. We find over-
all that the model works rather well, but certain parts of the model
do not. For example, we find that the exchange rate converges
strongly to the predicted equilibrium value (see result 1), but the
prices in some of the commodity markets do not (see result 3). This
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is quite remarkable since the foreign exchange market is used only
to facilitate trading in the underlying commodity markets. The over-
all result is very important since it demonstrates that many aspects
of the price discovery process can be accurately described by simple
equilibrium equations even if other aspects of the data are inconsis-
tent with equilibrium behavior.
A second question, which is closely related to the first, is, Do we
see the same types of failures of the model that are found in the
field? Variables thought to cause the failure of the model in the field
are not present. As will be reported in the paper, similar failures are
observed in the experiments; therefore, the theory may fail to ex-
plain the data in the field as a result of much more fundamental
causes than was previously thought. Specifically, we find in the exper-
iments that the law of one price (LOP) and purchasing power parity
(PPP) do not work well at all. As it turns out, LOP and PPP do not
work well in the field either (Meese and Rogoff 1983; Kimbrough
1987; Krugman and Obstfeld 1994). The failure of LOP and PPP to
explain the field data has been met by an avalanche of models and
theories.1 This research has suggested a number of explanations for
the failures of LOP and PPP to fit the data. Most prominent among
them are the existence of governmental trade barriers and transpor-
tation costs, the presence of nontraded goods, imperfect competi-
tion, difficulties measuring national price indices accurately, and
changes in the terms of trade. However, none of the factors sug-
gested by this vast literature is present in our laboratory environ-
ments and therefore could not be responsible for the observed fail-
ures. This suggests that LOP and PPP could fail in the field as a
result of more fundamental causes than has been previously sup-
posed. Section VIII of the paper addresses this issue.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the labora-
tory economies. The economic environments were designed to have
a classical structure in which the competitive model could be natu-
rally applied, with the equilibria easily computed and well separated
from the predictions of other models in order that the results not
be confused. The choice of design reflects practical difficulties asso-
ciated with conducting complex experiments. Previous experimen-
tal results can be used as ‘‘baselines’’ of behavior, but the need to
separate the predictions of various models is central to the design.
Section III outlines the experimental design and procedures. The
1 There has been an interest in the development of theoretical models that would
produce departures from purchasing power parity as equilibrium phenomena
(Sargent 1987; Grilli and Roubini 1992). However, the variables that can cause equi-
librium departures in the models are not present in the actual economies we created.
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models are discussed in Section IV, and the predictions are high-
lighted in Section V. A special statistical methodology is in Section
VI. The results are listed in Section VII. Section VIII analyzes the
reasons for the failure of LOP and PPP. Section IX summarizes our
conclusions.
II. The Laboratory Economies
The experimental setup is consistent with requiring a type of cash-
in-advance constraint, similar to that imposed by Lucas (1982). The
parameters are set so that gains from exchange exist from interna-
tional trade. That is, in the competitive equilibrium, foreign trade
exists. However, the experimental environment requires that im-
porters purchase foreign exchange in advance of their purchase of
foreign goods. No agent is allowed to sell a good in a foreign country,
so an agent cannot acquire foreign exchange by export and sale.
Therefore, agents must acquire foreign exchange in advance of their
purchases of foreign goods directly in the foreign exchange market.
Of course, this activity creates a supply of home currency to the ex-
change market.
Two countries were indexed A and B. Each country produced two
goods that were called x and y . Each country had three buyers of x
and y who were indifferent between the source of supply. That is, a
consumer in A received the same utility from x supplied from A as
he received from x supplied from B, and similarly with y . Conse-
quently, it will make sense to talk about a demand for and supply
of x at either the country level or the world level. In addition, each
country had three suppliers, each of whom supplied both x and y .
Buyers in each country had utility functions of the form U.S. dol-
lars 5 a[Mc 2 M 0 1 R x(x) 1 R y(y)], where a is a scale factor; Mc is
the currency of the country in which the agent resides; M 0 is the
initial endowment of the home currency; x and y are the consump-
tion by the individual, measured in the units of the two commodities;
and R is denominated in terms of the home currency. Similarly, sup-
pliers in a given country had an incentive function of the form U.S.
dollars 5 b[Mc 2 M 0 2 C x(x) 2 Cy(y)], where C is denominated in
home currency units. All agents received a large initial endowment
of home currency but had no endowment of foreign currency. Sell-
ers received an endowment of x and y, and C x(x) and C y(y) repre-
sented the cost of sale. Buyers received no initial endowment of ei-
ther x or y. Notice that individuals placed no value on the currency
of the country in which they did not reside. So, this world had two
countries with six agents in each, two commodities, and two curren-
cies that had a value only to the agents of the home country.
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Preferences were induced such that the aggregate demand and
supplies were approximated by the following equations:
country A: x demand: 43 2 .75x 2 p Ax 5 0,
x supply: 2 1 2x 2 p Ax 5 0,
y demand: 65 2 3y 2 p Ay 5 0,
y supply: 11 1 1.5y 2 p Ay 5 0;
country B: x demand: 925 2 45x 2 p Bx 5 0,
x supply: 127.5 1 15x 2 p Bx 5 0,
y demand: 2,646 2 36y 2 p By 5 0,
y supply: 150 1 180y 2 p By 5 0.
The notation p ik means the price of commodity k that exists in coun-
try i . These functions are shown in figure 1.
Constraints on trade were imposed to force the use of the interna-
tional financial markets. First, all purchases and sales in a country
had to be made in terms of the local currency. It was not possible
to buy in a foreign country without having foreign currency first,
and no agent was endowed with foreign currency. Second, no agent
was allowed to export, but all agents could import. This meant that
an agent who wanted to buy abroad could not sell abroad in order
to get the exchange. The agent was required to go to the exchange
market and purchase foreign currency with the home currency.
Once purchases were made abroad, they could be transported to
the home country without cost and either consumed or resold for
home currency.
III. Experimental Design and Procedures
Four experiments were conducted. The subjects were students at the
California Institute of Technology and the University of Amsterdam.
Three sessions took place at the Laboratory for Experimental Eco-
nomics and Political Science at Caltech, and one took place at the
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Deci-
sion-Making at the University of Amsterdam, in the Netherlands. A
list of the experiments indexed by the date of the experiment can
be found in table 1.
The experiments were conducted in English, and the subjects
were paid in U.S. dollars at Caltech and in Dutch guilders at Amster-
dam. All the Amsterdam subjects had participated in one pilot exper-
iment of this series previously. This was intended to acquaint them
Fi
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TABLE 1
Experiments: Location, Subjects, and Experience
Number of Number of
Index* Location Subjects Experience Periods
011393 Caltech 12 General market 10
011493 Caltech 12 General market 10
040793 Univ. Amsterdam 12 1 pilot experiment 10
042193 Caltech 12 General market 10
* Index corresponds to the date on which the experiment was conducted.
with the accounting procedures, the computer keys, and the general
setting in which the economic activity takes place in an experiment.
The Caltech subjects had not participated in international finance
experiments previously, but a substantial fraction of these subjects
had been in other market experiments before.
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects went
through an interactive computerized instructional program that
took about 30 minutes. This program gave them instructions about
the keys and the other functions of the computer.2 Afterward, the
experimenter read the specific instructions for this experiment
aloud as the subjects followed along, reading from their own copy.
Subjects were shown at the board an example of how to read a re-
demption value sheet and a cost schedule, the two sheets on which
their incentive functions were displayed. They were also instructed
on how to calculate their profits, which they were required to do on
their end-of-period summary sheets. Examples of the written materi-
als used can be found in the Appendix.
After the instruction was completed, the market was replicated 11
times, each replication constituting a period. Each was like a trading
day, and each day was identical. The first period was used for practice
and did not count toward subjects’ cash earnings. Each individual
kept the same ‘‘utility function’’ in each replication, although indi-
viduals’ utility functions differed among agents. Thus the market
environment was kept constant over the 10 periods following the
practice period. All inventories of goods and currencies were reset
at the same starting level each period. Nothing was carried over from
period to period, except the earnings of the subjects.
In each of the experiments there were 12 subjects, six buyers and
six sellers. There were three buyers and three sellers in each country.
2 This program is part of the general multiple unit double auction (MUDA) pro-
gram outlined in Plott (1991) and is contained in the diskette that accompanies the
general market program used in the experiment.
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As a resident of a country, each agent was endowed with an inventory
of his or her home currency, and only the home currency had value
to him or her. Consumption and home currency cash had value in
U.S. dollars or Dutch guilders, depending on the location of the
experiment. The foreign currency had no value, except as a means
of buying the goods abroad, which could then be consumed or sold
for home currency.
The market mechanism employed was a modified version of the
computerized MUDA. The program was modified to allow for mul-
tiple countries, represented by different pages on the computer
screen. Each page (country) contained three markets in which all
trades took place in terms of the local currency. The page also listed
the amount of that country’s cash that the subject had on hand,
which could be used to buy in the markets in that country. Sales in
that country added to the amount of that country’s cash that the
subject had on hand. The three markets allowed trading of x, y, and
the currency of the other country. So purchases and sales in these
markets, as well as the purchase and sale of the currency of the other
country, were made in terms of the currency relevant to the page,
and all bids and asks were quoted in terms of the currency of that
page. When the subject changed pages to the other country, the
cash on hand of the first page became the inventory of foreign cur-
rency on the second page, and the inventory of foreign currency on
the first page became the cash on hand on the second page. This
convention automatically enforced the requirement that all transac-
tions in a country took place in terms of the currency of that country.
Any agent could transport goods from another country into his
own, but no individual could transport to the foreign country di-
rectly. The MUDA program allows for transformations of inventory
in one group of markets (one country) to another group of markets
(another country), possibly on different pages on the computer.
This feature was used to implement international transport. Pur-
chases in a foreign country, made with the currency from that coun-
try, were automatically credited to the inventory of the commodity
held by the subject in the foreign country. The inventory of that
commodity could be costlessly transformed into the inventory of the
same commodity in the subject’s home country. Once in the home
country, the commodity could be sold at home for cash or con-
sumed. Thus imports were allowed but exports were not. That is, no
individual could transform inventories held at home to the inventory
of the same commodity held in the foreign country. This restriction
was needed to force the use of the currency markets. If transporta-
tion in both directions had been allowed, the subject could have
exported a commodity and sold it for foreign currency, which could
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have then been used to purchase commodities for import and sale
at home without ever using the foreign currency markets. Since the
operation of the currency market was considered to be a fundamen-
tal purpose of the experiment, steps were taken to make sure that
such markets had a function and would thus be used.
IV. Models
Two models are considered, competition and autarky. In the com-
petitive model, agents make trades of commodities and correspond-
ing purchases and sales of foreign exchange to permit these trades.
There is no role for money, foreign or domestic, other than this
transactions demand. Since the experimental agents receive payoffs
for domestic (but not foreign) currency held at the end of each
period, this is an economy in which demanders and suppliers have
(domestic) money in their utility functions. In other words, the do-
mestic money has commodity value, but not to foreigners.
The competitive outcome can be found by solving equations (1)–
(7) below. There is also a possibility that autarky will occur. That is,
traders will choose not to engage in foreign trade. This is not an
unreasonable notion, as one might believe at first glance, consider-
ing the risks of participating in the foreign exchange market and
the complexity of international transactions.
A. The Competitive Model
The competitive model has three components. Home market de-
mand and supply give four equations that require that materials bal-
ance and that incentives to buy and sell be equated at existing prices.
The second set of equations, which we call purchasing power parity,
can be viewed as nonarbitrage conditions. They require that prices
in the two countries, adjusted for exchange rates, be the same. The
final component requires equilibrium in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, given the special definitions of market demand and market sup-
ply based on imports and exports. Of course, these three compo-
nents can be viewed as partial equilibrium models independently of
any general equilibrium implications.
1. Home Market Demand and Supply
The law of supply and demand in the home markets captures the
idea that home prices are determined by local demand, plus exports
in relation to local supply, plus imports. In essence, the principles
of demand and supply operate independently of the origin, ultimate
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destination, or use of the commodities. The theory is captured by
the following equations:
D Ax (p Ax ) 5 S Ax (p Ax ) 1 imports, (1)
D Ay (p Ay ) 5 S Ay (p Ay ) 2 exports, (2)
D Bx (p Bx ) 5 S Bx (p Bx ) 2 exports, (3)
and
D By (p By ) 5 S By (p By ) 1 imports, (4)
where D Lj and S
L
j equal the quantity demanded and supplied, respec-
tively, of good j in country L .
2. Law of One Price and Purchasing Power Parity
In contrast to the home market demand and supply, the LOP theory
generalizes the idea of market clearing to extend across interna-
tional boundaries. In the absence of tariffs, taxes, transportation
costs, and other complicating factors, the theory asserts that the
prices of the goods will be the same in both countries after prices
are factored by the exchange rates. It is the LOP theory that can be
interpreted as governing the flow of imports and exports in response
to relative prices and the exchange rate.
Let r be the exchange rate, that is, the price of currency A in terms
of currency B. The equations for the LOP theory are
rp Ax 5 p Bx (5)
and
rp Ay 5 p By . (6)
Purchasing power parity theory is a similar relationship to (5) and
(6) except that price indices are substituted for the prices of the
goods. In Section VII we evaluate PPP using an appropriate price
index for the experimental economy.
3. Flow of Funds Theory
It is the flow of funds theory that provides the final equation for
exchange rate determination. Briefly, the theory is another way of
saying that the exchange rate is determined by the demand for and
supply of a currency. Formally the equation is
(demand for imports of x by A)p Bx
5 r(demand for imports of y by B)p Ay .
(7)
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The left-hand side of the equation is the international demand for
currency B that results from the country A purchases of x from coun-
try B. Country A needs this amount of country B currency in order
to make the purchases. The right-hand side of the equation is the
supply of currency B in the international market. The imports of y
by country B, when multiplied by the country A price of y, yield the
total amount of country A currency that is needed by country B in
order to purchase the imports. When multiplied by the exchange
rate (the units of currency B needed to purchase a unit of currency
A), the quantity on the right-hand side of the equation becomes the
international supply of currency B.
Care must be exercised in interpreting equation (7). First, be-
cause the exchange rate r is measured in units of B per unit of A,
an increase in the price of currency B is a decrease in r. Second,
unless operational definitions are selected carefully, equation (7)
can acquire the properties of a tautology. In particular, if ‘‘actual
imports’’ are substituted for the ‘‘demand for imports,’’ if all inter-
national exchange is spent on foreign goods (no unused exchange
and no currency speculation), and if r is defined as an appropriate
weighted average of transactions, then the equation must be satisfied
by virtue of the definitions. In some of the analysis that follows, ac-
tual imports are used in the statistical analysis, so the degree to which
the equation is not satisfied reflects the existence of speculation,
wasted exchange, and the lack of appropriate weighting of individ-
ual transactions in the determination of the measure of r. The
reader will be warned when this takes place.
Previous studies have consistently found that there is a strong ten-
dency for double auction markets to converge to the competitive
equilibrium with replication of the market period, even when there
are multiple interdependent markets (Noussair, Plott, and Riezman
1995). However, the economy constructed here provides a very dif-
ficult test for the model. The cash-in-advance constraint and the
existence of substantial international trade in the competitive equi-
librium mean that importers must purchase foreign exchange for
the model to predict correctly. Furthermore, agents must purchase
enough foreign exchange to be able to import the competitive equi-
librium amount of international trade and then sell all unused for-
eign exchange at the competitive equilibrium exchange rate.
B. Autarky Model
The autarky model is one alternative to the competitive model. It
predicts that international trade will not take place; instead, the
economies will operate as though they were in isolation. The model
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TABLE 2
Predicted Prices of the Competitive Equilibrium Model and the Autarky
Model: Countries A and B, Commodities x and y, and Exchange Rates
of Currencies A and B
Country A Country B
Currency Currency
Model x y A/B x y B/A
Competitive equilibrium 15 40 1/47 682 1,888 47
Autarky 32 29 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 327 2,230 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Note.—Prices in the table (except for the price of currency B in country B) are the values of the solution
to the continuous approximation of the experimental parameters rounded to the nearest integer.
should be taken seriously and not only as a benchmark. If the cur-
rency markets suffer from continuous disequilibrium, if the dynam-
ics of adjustment are such that international trade is hazardous, if
the transactions are too slow or fast, or if the market periods are too
short, then international trade might not take place.
V. Predictions
Both the competitive and the autarky models predict the exact value
of each of the variables in the system. That is, the models predict
the prices in both countries and for all commodities, the exchange
rate, the magnitude of imports and exports, and so forth. Some of
these predictions are summarized in table 2.
The prediction of the competitive model is the solution to equa-
tions (1)–(7). The prediction of the autarky model is the solution
to equations (1)–(4) with the value of all imports and exports con-
strained to be zero. The table displays the solutions to the equations
rounded to the nearest integer. The exact demand and supply func-
tions used in the experiment were discrete step functions that are
approximated by the continuous functions listed in Section II and
displayed in figure 1.
VI. Statistical Methodology
The application of statistical models to experimental market data is
characterized by some classic problems. This section will facilitate
an understanding of the methodology used in this paper and its pos-
sible limitations. Two problems appear not to have any good solu-
tion, given the current state of theory and estimation techniques, so
all conclusions must be evaluated in light of the tenuous assump-
tions that are explicit and implicit in the statistical models. The first
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problem is that the models, such as the competitive model, make
predictions of the magnitudes of a large number of variables. From
an intuitive point of view, it is not surprising if the model fails on
one or even several dimensions, but the statistical models that we
have available are not forgiving of errors of any type.
The second problem occurs because the theoretical model is a
static equilibrium model, whereas the data are clearly generated by
a dynamic process. Furthermore, in simpler experiments the exis-
tence of a convergence phenomenon has been demonstrated on
many occasions. Thus any statistical model must be sufficiently for-
giving of the lack of theory of dynamics to allow some latitude for
convergence.
The first problem is not addressed. Instead, each of the major
predictions of a model is considered separately. Each variable is ob-
served separately, and the question is posed about its magnitude in
relation to the predictions of one or the other of the models.
The second problem is addressed by the application of a simple
dynamic model.3 This model assumes that, for any particular depen-
dent variable, each experiment may start from a different origin but
all markets will experience adjustment, as described by a common
functional form. Furthermore, the model assumes that the variable
will converge to a common asymptote. Formally, the model is
z it 5 B 11 D111t 2 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 1 B 1k Dk11t 2 1 B 21t 2 1t 2 1 uit, (8)
where i is the index of the experiment, Dj are dummy variables that
take the value one if i 5 j and zero otherwise, t is time measured in
terms of the number of the experimental period, k is the number
of experiments, and u is a random variable distributed normally with
zero mean.
Notice that the statistical model has some useful properties. It
allows for the possibility that variables may take different values at
the start of different experiments. The terms B 1i measure these dif-
ferent origins of the data for the different experiments. The model
then captures the specification that the experiments are converging
to a common asymptote. During the early periods the asymptote gets
no weight because the term (t 2 1)/t is small; but as t gets large,
the term goes to one whereas 1/t goes to zero. Thus the weight of
the end of the experimental session is on the common term B 2.
Thus the model can be used to test the hypothesis that the data
3 This model is called the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal model in Noussair et al. (1995),
where it is first used.
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are converging to the predictions of various models by testing
whether or not the estimates of B 2 are significantly different from
the predictions of the models. In addition, a notion of partial conver-
gence can be used to assess the models. Comparison of the B 1j terms
with the B 2 term reveals the direction of convergence. If the B 2 term
is closer to the model’s prediction than the B 1j terms are, we say that
the data are partially converging to the model’s predictions. If the B 2
term is not significantly different from a model’s prediction, we say
that the variable is strongly converging to the prediction.
VII. Results
Figures 2 and 3 contain time series for the two goods markets in
each of the two countries for one of the experiments (experiment
042193). On the vertical axes are measured the prices in terms of
the currency in which transactions took place. On the horizontal
axes is measured the time in seconds at which actions occurred.
These are the actual transaction price observations. Vertical lines
indicate the start and end of periods. The data from the goods mar-
kets in country A are in figure 2 and the data from the goods markets
in country B are in figure 3. One horizontal line represents the value
of the competitive equilibrium for the appropriate variable, and an-
other indicates the prediction of the autarky model. Both lines are
labeled accordingly. Figure 4 contains the time series of the ex-
change rate for all four experiments, which corresponds to the
prices in the market for currency A in country B. In addition, a mar-
ket was opened for currency B in country A. Since the MUDA pro-
gram allows trading only at integer prices, at a competitive equilib-
rium price of 1/47, activity in the market for currency B in country
A quickly ceased in every experimental session.
The data in figures 2 and 3 are typical of all the experiments. The
prices seem to be moving toward the competitive equilibrium prices,
although there is substantial variation in prices within periods. Early
in the experiments, the prices for x in country A are higher than
the competitive equilibrium levels, and the prices for x in country
B are lower than the competitive equilibrium levels. As can be seen
in figure 4, near the end of all the experiments, the exchange rate
is close to the competitive equilibrium, although it tends to be lower
early in each of the sessions.
Estimates of the parameters of the statistical model are contained
in table 3. The standard errors are in parentheses. Each variable is
estimated separately. In addition, separate tests are developed from
the equations that define PPP theory and flow of funds theory. These
tests are also contained in the table. The standard errors are cor-
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rected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) covariance matrix
estimator.4 The variables analyzed for prices and exchange rates
equal the average transaction price during a market period, the unit
of observation.
The analysis begins with the most central variables, the exchange
rate and the volume of currency exchanged. If the response of these
variables to the underlying economic conditions is not as predicted by
theory, then the magnitudes of all other variables would be affected
relative to theory. The first result is that the exchange rates are at
a level anticipated by the competitive model. The second result is
that the volume of exchange falls short of the competitive quantity.
Result 1. Exchange rates converge strongly to the competitive
prediction.
Support . Refer to the row labeled r in panel A of table 3. The com-
petitive equilibrium exchange rate is 47. The estimate of B 2 for r,
the exchange rate variable, is 47.015 with a standard error of 2.381,
as shown in the first row of the table. The hypothesis that the ex-
change rates are strongly converging to the predictions of the com-
petitive equilibrium model cannot be rejected. Q.E.D.
The volume of exchange for country B is shown in figure 5. Since
the volume of currency in country A is related to the volume of cur-
rency in country B by the exchange rate, only one country is shown.
Panel A of table 3 has statistics for country A, whereas the figure
has data for country B. For the most part, the figure shows that the
competitive model is rejected because of insufficient trade, espe-
cially in one of the experiments (experiment 040793). The same
conclusion is evident from the table.
Result 2. The volume of exchange in the international market
falls short of the competitive equilibrium volume. In only one of the
experiments is the volume partially converging to the competitive
equilibrium. The autarky model can be rejected.
Support. The estimates from the model are in panel A of table 3,
listed as the variable V cur. The estimated asymptote of the volume,
B 2, is 351 compared with the competitive equilibrium volume, which
should be at least 461. It could be more than 461 without being
inconsistent with the model because of the possible existence of
speculation. The hypothesis that the asymptotic value of the actual
volume equals the theoretical value can be rejected. In addition, the
4 The results are not substantially different without the correction for hetero-
skedasticity. Every coefficient B 2 that is significantly different at the 5 percent level
from the competitive equilibrium or from autarky remains so if the correction is
not performed. Likewise, every B 2 coefficient that is not significantly different from
the predictions of one of the models at the 5 percent level with the correction is
not significantly different from the model’s prediction without the correction.
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Fig. 5.—Volume in the currency B market over time: all sessions
B 1j terms for at least three experiments are closer to the competitive
equilibrium than the asymptote. Since the B 1j terms are the measures
of the beginning of the adjustment process, partial convergence is
not observed. Q.E.D.
Though the volume of currency A is not converging toward the
competitive equilibrium quantity, the amount of currency B traded
increases from very low levels at the beginning of each session toward
the competitive equilibrium quantity of 21,532 over the course of
the session. This tendency is apparent in figure 5. The convergence
of the volume of currency B, but not currency A, is associated with
an increase in r, the exchange rate, over the course of each session.
Result 2 serves as a signal that these systems are not exactly on
track as described by the competitive equilibrium model. Since the
volume is not accurate, the simultaneous nature of the model’s equa-
tion system suggests that inaccuracies are likely to exist elsewhere.
The following results constitute an attempt to isolate the errors and
find the fundamental causes. The prices that exist in each country
are the obvious places to begin. They are addressed by the following
result.
Result 3. Price patterns have the following properties: (i) Prices
within countries partially converge to the competitive equilibrium
predictions. (ii) Relative prices of x and y are converging in the par-
tial sense toward the competitive equilibrium prediction in both
countries. (iii) The competitive equilibrium is a better predictor
than autarky is.
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Support. Part i: Panel B of table 3 contains the estimates of the
B 1j term for the prices of two countries, two commodities, and four
experiments. It contains the estimate of the B 2 terms for each of the
four prices (two countries and two commodities, p Ax , p Ay , p Bx , and
p By ). Three of the four B 2 terms, which are measures of the price
asymptotes, are significantly different from the prediction of the
competitive model, and all four are different from that of autarky.
In all but five cases (four instances of p Ay and one instance of p By ) of
the 16 possibilities, the data are further from the competitive equilib-
rium at the start of the experiment than at the end. Part ii: Panel
B of table 3 contains the test for the variables p Ax /p Ay and p Bx /p By . As
can be seen, the hypothesis that B 2 is the ratio that is predicted by
the competitive equilibrium can be rejected in both cases (two coun-
tries and two price ratios). The ratios seem close to 0.7 and 0.33
compared to the equilibrium predictions of 0.36, and the differ-
ences are statistically significant. The partial convergence is clearly
present since, in all eight possible cases, the data at the beginning
of the experiment are further from the competitive equilibrium
than are the pooled data at the end. Part iii: In both cases the B 2
estimate is closer to the competitive equilibrium than it is to the
autarky predictions. Q.E.D.
It is interesting to note that while the absolute prices are not at
the competitive equilibrium, the movements are in that direction.
Furthermore, the price ratios in both countries are not at the com-
petitive levels, but the movement is in that direction. Thus the rela-
tive scarcities in a country are being reflected by prices even though
the absolute levels of prices are off.
The previous result examined the data from the point of view of
prices within a country. The next result views the data from the per-
spective of relative prices across countries and factors in the ex-
change rate. It indicates that the nature of the responses of the vari-
ables to the underlying economic conditions might differ according
to the commodity.
Result 4. The law of one price, as defined by equations (5) and
(6), receives some support in the market for y but is rejected in the
market for x . Partial convergence is not present in the x market but
is present in the y market.
Support. The test statistics are in panel B of table 3 for the variables
p Bx /(r 3 p Ax ) and p By /(r 3 p Ay ). The hypothesis that the equation is
satisfied in the y market can be rejected at the .025 level. The coeffi-
cient B 2 is 0.69, as opposed to the 1.0 predicted by the competitive
model. Partial convergence is also present in every experiment. In
the x market the coefficient B 2 is 0.4, as opposed to 1. As measured
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by the variable B 1i, in the x market, two of the experiments are closer
at the end than at the beginning.
The next result extends the analysis to a version of PPP theory.
In order to cast the competitive model in the terms in which it is
ordinarily applied, price indices are developed and used to reformu-
late LOP as PPP. Of course, this theory is sensitive to the choice of
indices. The result is stated next.
Result 5. Purchasing power parity is not supported statistically in
the data.
Support. Price indices were constructed using actual volume as
weights. Consider the estimation of the following variable Z , where
Z 5 r3p Ax (x Ac 1 x Bc ) 1 p Ay (y Ac 1 y Bc )p Bx (x Ac 1 x Bc ) 1 p By (y Ac 1 y Bc )4.
The terms [p Ax (x Ac 1 x Bc ) 1 p Ay (y Ac 1 yBc )] and [p Bx (x Ac 1 x Bc ) 1
p By (y Ac 1 yBc )] are price indices in countries A and B, respectively.
The prices of the two commodities x and y are weighted by the com-
modities’ shares in the world consumption bundle. Under PPP, the
exchange rate equalizes purchasing power in the two countries so
that Z 5 1. The estimates are given in panel B of table 3 in the row
labeled Z .
As can be seen in the table, the estimated asymptotic value of Z ,
as measured by the variable B 2, is 1.157, and it is significantly differ-
ent from one at the p , .005 level. Thus, since the estimated asymp-
tote is about 15 percent off, the PPP model fails. Q.E.D.
Notice that PPP does not fail because of an inappropriate con-
struction of price indices. The theory fails because the underlying
and motivating LOP fails. Thus results 5 and 6 together demonstrate
that a phenomenon found in the field data, the failure of PPP, is
also found in the experimental economies.
The previous three results suggest that inaccuracies of the compet-
itive model reside in both intercountry and intracountry compari-
sons. The next result is an attempt to focus more clearly on the be-
havior of the localities in which the price formation process takes
place. Equations (1)–(4) are local market demand and supply equa-
tions. They say that, in each country and for each commodity, the
local prices are set by the local conditions of demand and supply,
together with the imports and exports. They are statements about
the reaction of domestic economies to the underlying economic
forces. The question posed is whether or not excess demand or ex-
cess supply, as defined by the actual parameters of the experiment
and by the observed prices, exists in the local economies. Have the
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prices adjusted in the domestic economies, or are they adjusting to
satisfy the partial equilibrium condition that demand equals supply?
The result suggests that the two countries are adjusting much differ-
ently.
Result 6. Domestic excess demand for good x is not converging
to zero in country A, but for y in country A, it is converging to zero
in the partial sense. Domestic excess demand is converging strongly
to zero in country B, for y and for x .
Support. Excess demand is defined by actual experimental parame-
ters. Prices are average prices in a period. The estimated coefficients
in panel C of table 3 provide the support. In the table, excess de-
mand for m in country J is denoted by ED Jm. In country A there is
an excess supply of x at the asymptote B 2, of the adjustment path of
9.1 units. This is significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the
asymptote is further from the equilibrium than the starting point in
three of the four experiments. Similarly, there is a significant excess
demand (3.6 units) for y in country A. However, the market is con-
verging in the partial sense to an excess demand of zero in three of
the four experiments. In country B the excess demand for both x
and y is converging to zero in the strong sense. Q.E.D.
Result 6 indicates that the law of supply and demand is operating
at the local levels, but an inexplicable asymmetry exists between the
countries. The question to pose is whether there might exist a
deeper problem as a result of the way the law is formulated at the
international level to determine the exchange rate. The next result
is fundamental. It says that the flow of funds theory is operating to
determine the rate of exchange.
Two different types of models can be used to assess the flow of
funds theory of exchange rate determination. The first rests on the
fact that the international financial flows must satisfy the following
accounting identity:
p Bx 3 I Ax 1 p By 3 I Ay 1 B AH 5 r(p
A
x 3 I Bx 1 p Ay 3 I By 1 A BH), (9)
where J KH is the quantity of currency J held at the end of a market
period by residents of country K, and I Jm 5 max[0, IMP
J
x], where
IMP Jm is the net imports of m by country J. The left side of the equa-
tion is equal to the total amount of currency B purchased by resi-
dents of country A; the right side equals the total amount of currency
A purchased by residents of country B, multiplied by the exchange
rate, which is the price of currency A in terms of currency B. The
equation does not include purchases and subsequent resale of cur-
rency, which is presumably due to speculation. Thus each side of
the equation represents currency demanded and supplied for trans-
action purposes, plus wasted foreign exchange. In terms of the no-
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tation introduced above, BAH and A
B
H are the quantities of foreign
exchange that are ‘‘wasted’’ in each of the countries A and B, respec-
tively.
The competitive model predicts that
p Bx 3 I Ax 1 p By 3 I Ay 1 B AH 5 21,532, (10)
p Ax 3 I Bx 1 p Ay 3 I By 1 A BH 5 461, (11)
r 5 47, (12)
and
p By 3 I Ay 5 B AH 5 A
B
H 5 p
A
x 3 I Bx 5 0. (13)
The first approach to flow of funds theory testing rests on interpreta-
tions of statistical tests of the last two equations. The data are cap-
tured by result 7.
Result 7. The international flow of funds is moving toward the
competitive equilibrium prediction.
Support. The variable p By 3 I Ay 5 0 in every period of every experi-
ment. The variable p Ax 3 I Bx 5 0 in every period of every experiment
except for the first three periods of experiment 011493. It can be
seen from panel D of table 3 that the variables B AH and p
B
x 3 I
A
x are
converging in the partial sense to the competitive predictions in all
four experiments, whereas r is converging strongly. The variable
A BH is converging partially in two of the four experiments and p
A
y 3
I By is converging partially in three of the four experiments. Q.E.D.
Result 7 indicates that the international flow of currency is con-
verging toward the level predicted by the competitive model. It is
obviously moving away from the autarky prediction of zero. Thus,
even though the volume in the currency market is not moving to
the competitive equilibrium prediction in result 2, the individual
components of the demand for and supply of currency, as expressed
in equation (9), are moving toward the predicted values. The poor
performance of the competitive model in predicting the volume in
the currency markets may be due to mistakes and speculation in
the early periods of the experimental sessions. Now we consider the
second approach, which is more deeply related to the dynamic rela-
tionship between r and the international demand for and supply of
currencies.
The second approach to testing flow of funds theory is based on
a hypothesis about the market. The test rests on the hypothesis that
the direction of movement of the exchange rate from period t 2 1
to period t is governed by the market conditions existing in period
t 2 1. If there was excess demand for currency A at the average
exchange rate in period t 2 l, we would expect r to rise in period
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t . This idea is expressed in the following equation:
rt 2 rt21 5 a 1 b($ At21 2 6
A
t21), (14)
where $ At21 and 6
A
t21 can be interpreted as the excess demand for
and excess supply of, respectively, currency A in period t 2 l. Spe-
cifically,
6 At21 5 3D Ax1p Bxr 2 2 x Ac 4 3 p
B
x
r
, (15)
where D Ax (p) is the market demand function for x by residents of
country A evaluated at price p, and x Ac is the total consumption of
x by residents of country A. Thus D Ax 2 x Ac is the additional amount
of x that A could profitably import, given the foreign prices of x and
its home consumption, which it did not import. When D Ax 2 x Ac is
multiplied by foreign prices and the exchange rate, it yields the
amount of home currency that must be spent to import the desired
additional amount; thus it is the excess supply of currency A to the
international market.
Similarly,
$ At21 5 [D
B
y (p Ay 3 r) 2 y Bc ] 3 p Ay , (16)
where D By equals the demand for good y by residents of country B,
which imports good y, measured at the actual country A prices and
exchange rate. When consumption of home and foreign production
is subtracted from desired consumption, a model of excess import
demand is obtained. Multiplication by p Ay yields the amount of cur-
rency A needed to make the purchases and thus yields a model of
international excess demand for currency A.
The model rests on the hypothesis that b . 0. This maintains that
the exchange rate increases in response to excess demand and de-
creases in response to excess supply of currency A. Furthermore, the
concepts of demand and supply are those that are built from the
flow of funds theory of international exchange rate determination.
An examination of the data produces the finding contained in re-
sult 8.
Result 8. The movement of the exchange rate from one market
period to the next is influenced by the international demand for
and supply of currency as defined by flow of funds theory as captured
in equation (14).
Support. The estimated coefficients and standard errors of equa-
tion (14) are given in table 4. Clearly b . 0, since the hypothesis
that b 5 0 can be rejected at the p , .01 level. A positive value for
b means that excess demand for currency leads to a higher exchange
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TABLE 4
Estimates of the Dynamic Model of Exchange Rate Adjustment
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic
a 1.885 1.470 1.282
b .000753 .000307 2.453
Note.—R 2 5 .17; Durbin-Watson 5 2.32.
rate in the next period. Although the coefficient is small, it indicates
the change in r for each unit of excess demand of A, the magnitude
of which was typically in the hundreds. The constant term is positive
but not significantly different from zero, suggesting a weak upward
trend over time, even when excess demand for and supply of cur-
rency are taken into account. Thus the dynamic pattern of move-
ment follows the hypothesized property: an excess demand for a cur-
rency in the flow of funds sense in period t means an increase in
the exchange rate in period t 1 1. Q.E.D.
The issue of dynamics is pursued further by a conjecture about
the direction of convergence. It is very clear from panel A of table
3 and figure 4 that the exchange rate is converging from below.
Since this is the first experimental study of an economy with multiple
currencies, any possible conjecture about the causes of the pattern
of convergence is speculative, but it is tempting to draw an analogy
with other market experiments. In single-market double auctions it
has been observed that the direction of convergence of prices over
time can be explained by the relative rents obtained by consumers
and producers in the competitive equilibrium (Smith and Williams
1982). Rents tend to be divided more equally between both sides of
the market at the beginning of the experiment than in the competi-
tive equilibrium. The conjecture below generalizes this idea to the
level of international economies.
Define the equal system surplus price adjustment path to be a
movement of the exchange rate such that (i) the exchange rate be-
gins at a level such that total gains from international trade are di-
vided equally and (ii) the exchange rate is converging to the compet-
itive equilibrium level. The concept of relative surplus of buyers and
sellers in the currency market can be expressed as the relative gains
in surplus of the two countries from international trade. For each
country, the gain can be expressed as the sum of the profits (in terms
of currency A) of the residents of the country in the competitive
equilibrium minus the sum of the residents’ profits in autarky. Ex-
plicitly the concept is the following.
Let CE equal the competitive equilibrium allocation and prices,
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AUT the autarky equilibrium allocation and prices, and ΠK(z, p) the
consumers’ surplus plus producers’ surplus of country K in alloca-
tion z and at price vector p measured in terms of currency K . These
magnitudes will be precisely defined when they are used in the dis-
cussion below.
The equal system surplus price adjustment path is an exchange
rate path that begins with an exchange rate r that solves the equation
Π A(CE) 2 ΠA(AUT) 5 [Π B(CE) 2 Π B(AUT)] 1
r
.
The numbers for the experimental parameters are [ΠA(CE);
ΠA(AUT)] 5 [949; 581] and [ΠB(CE); ΠB(AUT)] 5 [27,272;
19,697].5 The equation thus becomes 369 5 7,575/r. The r that
equates the surpluses is thus 20.53. According to this model, one
would expect the exchange rate to converge from below beginning
near 20, moving upward and seeking a limit at the competitive equi-
librium of 47.
Conjecture 1. The direction of convergence of the exchange rate
over time is determined by the equal system surplus price adjustment
path.
Support. A more equal division of the surplus than in the competi-
tive equilibrium would imply that the exchange rate at the beginning
of the experiment should tend to favor country B more than the
5 The calculations of the surpluses are made possible because of the separability
built into the experimental parameters. Inverse demand functions are well defined.
Let the inverse of a function be indicated by lowercase letters. That is, the demand
function DAx [ has an inverse function designated by the notation d Ax [. Thus, for
country A the difference between consumer plus producer surplus evaluated at the
competitive equilibrium and the consumer plus producer surplus evaluated at the
autarky equilibrium is
#
x A, CEc
0
[d Ax (X ) 2 p A, CEx ]dX 1 #
y A, CEc
0
[dAx (Y ) 2 p A, CEy ]dY
1 #
x A, CEp
0
[p A, CEx 2 s Ax (X )]dX 1 #
y A, CEp
0
[p A, CEy 2 s Ay (Y )]dY
2 #
x A, AUTc
0
[dAx (X ) 2 p A, AUTx ]dX 2 #
y A, AUTc
0
[dAy (Y ) 2 p A, AUTy ]dY
2 #
x A, AUTp
0
[p A, AUTx 2 s Ax (X )]dX 2 #
y A, AUTp
0
[p A, AUTy 2 s Ay (Y )]dY ,
where x A, CEc , x A, CEp , y A, CEc , and y A, CEp are the quantities of x and y consumed and pro-
duced in country A at the competitive equilibrium. The amounts at the autarky
equilibrium are indicated with the notation AUT replacing CE. Similarly, the equi-
librium prices at the competitive equilibrium and autarky are indicated with the
country as a superscript and the commodity as a subscript. A similar calculation can
be made for country B. The actual numbers are obtained by substituting the inverse
demand functions and supply functions from the formulas used as parameters in
the experiment that are found in Sec. II.
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competitive equilibrium exchange rate, indicating that currency B
should have a higher value than in the competitive equilibrium. This
implies an exchange rate less than 47 at the beginning of the experi-
ment, with a pattern of convergence toward the competitive level.
The equal system surplus price adjustment path begins with an ex-
change rate of 21. The estimates of the first-period exchange rates
for the four experiments found in panel A of table 3 are 29.238,
21.319, 22.956, and 7.606, respectively (an average of about 15).
Thus adjustment occurs from below in all experiments. The data
support the conjecture. Q.E.D.
The results above suggest that patterns of international finance
are similar but not exactly as predicted by the competitive model.
For the most part the financial variables are moving in directions
that would be suggested by the competitive equilibrium model. Ei-
ther wasted exchange or speculation occurs at first but decreases
over time. The next series of questions inquire about the real sectors
of the economies and the underlying trade. Since the financial vari-
ables are moving in ways that the competitive model anticipates, it
might be expected that the real sectors are responding accordingly
also. The next result confirms this. It says that the patterns of trade
are consistent with competitive theory.
Result 9. International trade patterns are consistent with the
principle of comparative advantage.
Support. The competitive model predicts that country A will import
x and country B will import y. As shown in panel E of table 3, net
imports of x by country A, denoted by IMP Ax in the table, are 23.9
units and net imports of y by country B are 8.9 units. These levels
are short of the quantitative predictions of the competitive model
of 32 units and 11 units, respectively; however, in all but two of the
eight possible cases, the data are moving toward the competitive
equilibrium quantities. These patterns are sufficient to support the
result. Q.E.D.
Since trade is developing along the lines of comparative advantage
and since the financial sectors are not far out of line, both consump-
tion and production patterns should be conforming to the model.
Since such conformity need not be the case, except as dictated by
the principles of economics, which are under investigation, it is nec-
essary to check. The next two results indicate that both are moving
in the directions anticipated.
Result 10. Consumption patterns are moving toward the predic-
tions of the competitive model.
Support. Two countries and two commodities represent four vari-
ables to consider. The variables are given as x Ac , y Ac , x Bc , and y Bc in
panel E of table 3. All four of these variables are significantly differ-
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ent from the competitive equilibrium as measured by the B 2 term.
But, in a sense, they are very close. For example, there are 8.67 units
of consumption of y in country A (the competitive equilibrium is
eight units) and 6.1 units of consumption of x in country B (the
competitive equilibrium is five units). The variables are partially con-
verging in all but two of the 16 possible cases (as measured by the
B 1i estimates as opposed to the B 2 estimates).
Result 11. Production patterns are moving toward the predic-
tions of the competitive equilibrium model.
Support. In 14 of the 16 cases (four variables and four experi-
ments) the production levels are partially converging to the competi-
tive equilibrium. See the rows marked x Ap , y Ap , x Bp , and y Bp in panel E
of table 3.
In an earlier work (Noussair et al. 1995), we demonstrated that
the patterns of production and trade predicted by the law of compar-
ative advantage are observed in an experimental market. In those
markets, members of different countries used the same currency.
Results 9, 10, and 11 confirm that when members of each country
use their own national currency to trade, the law of comparative
advantage still works well.
VIII. The LOP and PPP Paradox
A phenomenon that has been widely observed in the field is also
observed in the experimental economies. The equations derived
from PPP theory fail to be satisfied in the data. How can that be?
The experimental economies are much simpler than the field coun-
terparts. None of the conditions that might be troublesome to the
theory in the field is present in the experimental economies. One
could surmise that the experimental economies operate under con-
ditions that are very favorable to the theory. Indeed, not only does
PPP fail, but also the underlying and more fundamental theory,
LOP. Thus the experimental economies demonstrate that PPP and
LOP can fail for more fundamental reasons than has been supposed
in the literature.
We offer an observation and a conjecture about what the reason
for the failure might be. The first is related to the inherent uncer-
tainty in international finance. The second is related to the inherent
interdependence in a multicountry and multicurrency economy.
Observation.—When trading in foreign economies, agents take un-
avoidable risks. All actions and prices must include a risk premium.
Trading in the experimental environment involves risks that are
inherent in the trading technology. In the experimental economies,
agents must buy foreign exchange before they can trade in the for-
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eign commodity market. Thus agents must commit to buying the
currency (which is worthless to them except to buy foreign goods)
in the foreign market before they know at what price they will actu-
ally trade. This risk is not due to traders’ lack of knowledge about
the value of a system variable, but rather to uncertainty about
whether the markets will adjust to their equilibrium values and ex-
actly how and when this takes place. Thus there is not a way for them
to hedge this risk, although it would presumably be small if the time
lags were short. Nevertheless, previous experience in similar experi-
ments leads us to believe that agents must be compensated for taking
the extra risk. This could explain why even though the exchange
rate market equilibrates, LOP and PPP fail.
The conjecture is a type of coordination hypothesis. It results from
the nature of simultaneously interacting markets.
Conjecture 2. The law of one price fails because of the asymmet-
ric speed of adjustments of the price discovery process of local mar-
kets.
That fact that markets converge at different speeds is well known
to those that study experimental markets. This fact becomes impor-
tant to the issue of LOP in international finance. In order for LOP
(and to a lesser extent PPP) to be satisfied as an equilibrium condi-
tion, all markets have to be in equilibrium simultaneously. In fact,
what happens in the experimental economies is that markets con-
verge at different speeds, and within the time frames that were possi-
ble to observe, the simultaneous equilibration of all markets never
occurred (see result 6). This phenomenon leads to the failure of
LOP even when the exchange rate has converged to the level pre-
dicted by the competitive equilibrium model. Thus, if the same prin-
ciples of economics operate in the field as are operating in the ex-
perimental markets, LOP and PPP may fail because there are
multiple markets that are spatially separated, and the price discovery
process in the different markets operates at different speeds.6
We are unaware of any coherent, general model that might be
applied to capture all the complex adjustments that occur in the
experimental economies and will help us make the point rigorously.
However, the observation about risk premiums and conjecture 2 op-
erate together with other results to form an impression of how the
LOP failure occurs even under favorable circumstances. From con-
jecture 1 comes the proposition that the asymmetric gains from in-
6 There are suggestions in the literature that LOP and PPP fail because trading
takes time (Benninga and Protopapadakis 1988; Goodwin, Grennes, and Wohlgen-
ant 1990). While we see no inconsistency between our observations and their mod-
els, the role of time in their models is difficult to make operational in the experimen-
tal economies.
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ternational trade influence the exchange rate to converge from be-
low. Similarly, international trade, because of the inherent risks,
starts around the cautious, autarky level of zero and then moves up-
ward. So if international trade approaches the competitive equilib-
rium levels, it will approach from below. That property is observed
in the experimental markets.
Overall, the system is observed to move in the direction of the
competitive equilibrium. Early in the experiment, currency A is sell-
ing for below its competitive equilibrium level and currency B sells
for more than the competitive equilibrium. Thus, in this position of
disequilibrium, it is expensive for country A to import x as it is sup-
posed to, and with the lack of supply and competition from interna-
tional sources, the prices of x in country A are high, relative to the
competitive equilibrium. Similarly, in country B there is little inter-
national demand for x because of the low exchange rate, so the price
is low relative to the competitive equilibrium. In both cases the prices
of x respond according to this picture, with the x prices starting
above the equilibrium prices in country A and converging down-
ward and the x prices in country B starting below the competitive
equilibrium and converging upward. The fact of risk buttresses these
tendencies by decreasing the imports of x and thereby keeping the
prices of x high in country A and low in country B.
The influence of these pressures on the prices of y is different. In
country A the low exchange rate should place upward pressure on
price because of the international demand, but this pressure is offset
by the risk of international transactions. The excess demand at the
disequilibrium exchange rate is not as strong as it would be if there
were no risks, and thus the potential upward pressure on price is
muted. Similarly in country B, the low exchange rate should be ac-
companied by substantial imports of y with an accompanying down-
ward pressure on price. But the risk of international finance mutes
the importation of y and thereby decreases the excess supply that
would force prices down. These ‘‘cross pressures’’ result in ambigu-
ous price movements of y in both countries.
IX. Conclusions
The autarky model can be solidly rejected by these experiments. It
is not the case that the hazards of the foreign exchange markets are
such that international trade stops or takes place at very low levels
only. On the other hand, the competitive model is not perfect. In
most instances the outcome variables are converging to the competi-
tive prediction in the partial sense, but the model fails to predict the
exact levels of activity in many instances, even when the asymptotic
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tendencies are incorporated. Financial hazards of participation in
international trade do exist and can appear in the form of ‘‘wasted’’
exchange. However, the equilibrating tendencies of the system serve
to reduce the uncertainty and facilitate trade.
Generally speaking, the exchange rate seeks a level that is near
that predicted by the competitive model. Although the volume in
the currency market is less than the competitive level, the individual
components of currency flows seem to be moving toward the mod-
el’s predictions. The exchange rate movements from one period to
the next respond to the excess demand and supply conditions pre-
vailing in the currency market. Over the course of the experiment,
the exchange rate moves in accordance with the equal system sur-
plus adjustment path. The low volume in the foreign exchange mar-
ket suggests that the full gains from trade are not being realized,
and, indeed, international trade is below competitive levels. This rel-
atively low level of international trade may be associated with the
relative prices lying between the competitive and autarky predictions
in both countries. Country A seems to be more problematic, with the
price of x persistently much higher than the competitive equilibrium
level.
The low level of international trade observed in the experiments
may be due to the systemic risk resulting from the cash-in-advance
constraint. The risk of possible losses from holding foreign currency
when the market period ends, or having to sell it at a loss, requires
the would-be importer to be compensated for engaging in interna-
tional trade. Importing is worth it only for those units of x and y for
which the gains from international trade are great and is not worth
it for marginal units, which are therefore not imported. Thus the
cash-in-advance constraint functions much like an excise tax or a
tariff on international transactions, reducing the amount of interna-
tional trade of x and y to below the competitive equilibrium level.
In general, prices within countries do not seem to be adjusting
rapidly to local demand and supply conditions, although there is
evidence of slow convergence to local market clearing. The adjust-
ment is not taking place at all for market x in country A.
A perplexing phenomenon that has been observed in the field
appears in the experimental markets. The law of one price and pur-
chasing power parity fail. This failure of LOP and PPP can be traced
to the differing speeds at which markets adjust in the different coun-
tries. Thus, in the economies studied here, the mystery of the failures
resides in the nature of price dynamics in local economies. The
problems do not reside with the complete apparatus of the competi-
tive model. In these economies, PPP cannot fail because of problems
with price indexes since accurate indexes were constructed. In addi-
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tion, there are no trade barriers, nontraded goods, or transportation
costs. Thus we are able to conclude that the phenomena can have
another cause besides the variables that have been the focus of mod-
ern investigations. Violations of LOP and PPP arise naturally as dis-
equilibrium phenomena, even in simple laboratory international
economies.
Despite the behavior of local and international price ratios, which
show departure from the competitive equilibrium levels, the real sec-
tors of the economies are moving in the direction of the competitive
equilibrium. Patterns of international trade are consistent with the
law of comparative advantage. Local production and consumption
levels are converging to the competitive equilibrium as well.
The competitive model is not perfect, in any sense, but the princi-
ples on which the general theory is based lead to a model that pre-
dicts the general movement of economic activity in a very complex
and interdependent setting. When people discuss vague concepts of
‘‘economic forces,’’ these data suggest that the formalization of the
concepts with the competitive equilibrium model can be very useful.
The forces are increasing the international trade between the two
countries, with the result that the magnitudes of most outcome vari-
ables, especially net exports, production, consumption, and the ex-
change rate, move slowly toward the competitive equilibrium.
Appendix
Instructions and Forms
1. General Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good
decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be
paid to you in cash.
In the experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of
you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of trading
periods. Find a sheet labelled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to
you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal the information
on this sheet to anyone. It is your own private information.
In the experiment there are two goods and two locations, which you
could think of as separate countries. The goods are called X and Y and the
locations are called A and B. In location A, there is a market for X and a
market for Y. Also, in location B, there is a market for X and a market for
Y. As will be explained later, the locations will be on different screens on
the computer.
Each location has its own special currency. All transactions in location A
will take place in currency A and all transactions in location B will take
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place in currency B. Each unit of currency A is worth guilders to
you and each unit of currency B is worth guilders to you.
2. Specific Instructions to Sellers
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as
many units of X and Y as you might want. The first unit of X that you sell
in a trading period, you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on the sheet
in row (1) in the section of the sheet entitled Cost Schedule for X, in the
column labelled unit cost. The second unit of X that you sell during the
same trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed in row (2)
in the column marked unit cost, etc. The profits from each sale, which are
yours to keep, are computed by taking the difference between price at
which you sold the unit and the cost of the unit. That is:
Your Earnings 5 Sale Price of Unit 2 Cost of Unit
Suppose, for example, that you sell two units of X and that the cost for the
first unit of X is 140 and for the second unit is 160. If you sell the first unit
at 200 and the second at 190, your earnings are
Earnings from First 5 200 2 140 5 60
Earnings from Second 5 190 2 160 5 30
Total Earnings 5 60 1 30 5 90
The end of period summary will help you record your profits. On row
A, record the total cost of X that you sold during the period. The X which
you sold during the period is equal to your inventory of X at the beginning
of the market period minus your inventory at the end of the market period.
This total can be found in the row of the section labelled Cost Schedule
for X corresponding to the amount of X you sold during the period in the
last column, which is entitled total cost. For example, if you sold two units
during the market period, the total cost can be found in row (2). Similarly,
on row B, record the total cost of Y that you sold during the period.
On rows (C) and (D) record your beginning of period and end of period
inventory of the currency which has value to you. On row (E), enter an
amount equal to the amount in row (D) minus the amount in row (C). (E)
indicates your net change in cash for the market period. On row (F) record
your total profit for the period. The total profit equals the total cash ob-
tained from sales of X and Y minus the cost of the X and Y sold. It also
equals the amount in row (E) minus the amount in row (A) minus the
amount in row (B). Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.
3. Specific Instructions to Buyers
During each market period, you are free to purchase from any seller or
sellers as many units of X and Y as you might want. For the first unit of X
that you buy in a trading period, you will receive the amount listed in row
(1) in the section of the page entitled redemption value schedule for X in
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the column marked unit value. If you buy a second unit during the trading
period, you will receive the additional amount listed in row (2) in the col-
umn marked unit redemption value, etc. The profits from each purchase,
which are yours to keep, are computed by taking the difference between
the redemption value and the purchase price of the unit bought. That is:
Your Earnings 5 Redemption Value 2 Purchase Price
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units and that your redemption
value for the first unit is 200 and for the second unit is 180. If you pay 150
for the first unit and 160 for the second unit, your earnings are:
Earnings from First 5 200 2 150 5 50
Earnings from Second 5 180 2 160 5 20
Total Earnings 5 50 1 20 5 70
The end of period summary will help you record your profits. In row (A)
enter the total value of X consumed. This amount can be found in the
column labelled total value in the row corresponding to the total number
of X held in your inventory at the end of the period.
Similarly, record the total value of Y consumed in row (B). On rows (C)
and (D) record your beginning of period and end of period inventory of
the currency which has value to you. On line (E), enter an amount equal
to the amount in row (D) minus the amount in row (C). On line (F) record
your total profit for the period, which equals your redemption values for
having X and Y in your inventory at the end of the market period, minus
the cash which you spent to acquire them.
4. Currency
The locations are indicated by two computer screens. You can move from
screen to screen by using the page up and page down keys. On each screen
Cash on Hand is given in the upper right corner. On one screen, which
represents location A, the Cash on Hand indicates your inventory of cur-
rency A. On the other screen, which represents location B, the Cash on
Hand indicates your inventory of currency B.
While at location A, market 3 allows you to buy and sell currency B. Simi-
larily, while at location B, market 6 allows you to buy and sell currency A.
All participants may transfer units of X and Y from one of the locations
to the other. Some participants can transfer units of X and Y from location
B to location A, but not from location A to location B. The rest of the
participants can transfer units of X and Y from location A to location B,
but not from B to A. To transfer units, use the F4 key.
5. Trading Profits
A possible source of profits is from buying and selling X, Y, currency A,
and currency B. Selling increases your cash on hand by the amount of the
sale price. Buying reduces your cash on hand by the amount of the pur-
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End of Period Summary: Period
(A) Total Cost of X Sold (in Currency A)
(B) Total Cost of Y Sold (in Currency A)
(C) Beginning of Period Inventory of Currency A
(D) End of Period Inventory of Currency A
(E) Net Change in Currency A
(F) Total Profit for the Period (E) 2 (A) 2 (B)
End of Period Summary: Period
(A) Total Value of X in Final Inventory (in Currency B)
(B) Total Value of Y in Final Inventory (in Currency B)
(C) Beginning of Period Inventory of Currency B
(D) End of Period Inventory of Currency B
(E) Net Change in Currency B
(F) Total Profit for the Period (E) 1 (A) 1 (B)
chase. Thus, you can either gain or lose money on the purchase and resale
of units.
6. Beginning of Period Inventories
All sellers begin each period with inventory of X and Y. All buyers begin
each period with no X or Y. All participants begin each period with a large
inventory of either currency A or currency B. Beginning of period invento-
ries are the same for each market period.
Cost Schedule for X
Unit Cost Total Cost
Unit (in Currency B) (in Currency B)
(1) 150 150
(2) 195 345
(3) 240 585
(4) 285 870
(5) 330 1,200
(6) 375 1,575
(7) 420 1,995
(8) 465 2,460
(9) 510 2,970
(10) 555 3,525
(11) 600 4,125
(12) 645 4,770
(13) 690 5,460
(14) 735 6,195
(15) 780 6,975
(16) 825 7,800
(17) 870 8,670
(18) 915 9,585
(19) 960 10,545
(20) 1,005 11,550
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Redemption Value Schedule for Y
Unit Value Total Value
Unit (in Currency A) (in Currency A)
(1) 42 42
(2) 39 81
(3) 36 127
(4) 36 163
(5) 33 196
(6) 30 226
(7) 27 253
(8) 27 280
(9) 24 304
(10) 21 325
(11) 18 343
(12) 18 361
(13) 15 376
(14) 12 388
(15) 9 397
(16) 9 406
(17) 6 412
(18) 3 415
(19) 0 415
(20) 0 415
7. Note on the System
You can imagine yourself at one of the two locations with an inventory of
that location’s currency. Should you find it advantageous, you could buy the
currency of the other location and use it to buy X and/or Y there instead of
buying X and/or Y at your location.
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